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Abstract ： Environmental economics postulates the assumption of homo 
economicus and presumes that externality occurs as a result of the rational 
economic activities of economic agents. This paper examines this assumption 
using an experimental economic approach in the context of regime shift, which 
has been receiving increasing attention. We observe that when externality does 
not exist, economic agents (subjects of experimemt) act economically rationally, 
but when externality exists, economic agents avoid the risk of a regime shift that 
would have negative consequences for others. Our results suggest that 
environmental economics may have to reconsider the assumption of homo 
economicus. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Mainstream economics asserts that economic agents are selfish and that 
households and firms maximize their utilities and profits, respectively. As is well 
known, the assumption of homo economicus is underlying behind such 
explanations, where unboundedly rational economic agents are supposed. It is 
general knowledge that social welfare will be maximized as a result of selfish 
economic activities by unboundedly rational economic agents. 
 
In some situations, however, market failures will occur under the abovementioned 
situations; an example would be externalities in the form of environmental issues. 
Mainstream economics has treated externalities as exceptional cases whereas 
environmental economics has regarded externalities as frequent events and has 
built the subject to treat issues attributed to externalities. 
 
Until now, environmental economics has expressed disagreement with the fact 
that mainstream economics treats externalities as exceptions, but has connived 
at the assumption of homo economicus. Further, it examines solutions for 
externalities using tax, permit and other environmental policies. However, 
recently, doubts have been raised whether sustainable development can be 
achieved under the assumption of homo economicus (Becker 2006). In addition, 
many have argued that in the context of environmental economics, homo 
economicus and related agencies be replaced with other agencies such as homo 
biologicus, homo corporativus, homo ecologicus, homo politicus, and homo 
sustinens (Becker 2006, Bastien and Cardoso 2007). Kahneman (2003) suggests 
that economic agents are boundedly rational and a series of results of ultimatum 
games seems to support his suggestion. 
 
It is possible to explore a new image of an economic agent based on real human 
behaviour using experimental economic approaches. In doing so, the following 
should be noted. First, how different is a real human from homo economicus? 
Second, is it possible to suppose that the new image of the economic agent will be 
desirable under certain criteria? Even if we extract the new image of the economic 
agent which is remarkably similar to a real human, this new image may not 
necessarily be appropriate as the new model of a human in economics. In this 
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paper, we apply experimental economic methods to empirically examine the 
difference between a real human and homo economicus. 
 
Experimental economic methods were introduced relatively early in the field of 
environmental valuation. As Horowitz (2006) states that ‗[e]xperimental 
economics and environmental valuation have grown up together‘, environmental 
valuation is one of the leading fields in experimental economics. However, in the 
other fields of environmental economics, application of experimental economic 
methods and behavioural economic studies has been lagging. Venkatachalam 
(2008) states that, in the real economic activities, experimental and behavioural 
economic studies have revealed that rational behaviours are not necessarily 
observed. However, he also states that these studies are not common in 
environmental economics. 
 
In this paper, we study regime shift, which has recently been receiving increasing 
attention and examine the behaviours of economic agents in the context of 
environmental issues using experimental economic approaches. Regime shift is a 
phenomenon where the environment changes catastrophically. The catastrophe 
theory was advocated by the French mathematician René F. Thom in the 1960s 
and covered in Thom (1975). Recently, many related studies—Scheffer et al. 
(2001) and Scheffer and Carpenter (2003)—have been done in the context of 
ecology or environmental management. To the best of the author‘s knowledge, 
there is no existing research which treats regime shift in environmental issues as 
a topic of experimental economics. 
 
In short, this paper has originality in the following points. First, it examines how 
different is homo economicus from a real human in the context of environmental 
economics with particular focus on externality. Second, it applies the 
experimental economic approach when examining the first point. Third, it treats 
regime shift when applying the experimental economic approach. 
 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
The subjects were the attendants of the Agriculture and Economics class, which is 
one of the author‘s relay-type lectures at his university. In fiscal 2009, there are 
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201 freshmen in the university. The number of students who take this class is 163 
(92% of the attendants are freshmen), of which 148 students attended the 
author‘s lecture. The lecture and the experiment were performed on 3rd June 2009, 
when the freshmen were almost 2 months old. Almost all of the attendants will 
select an area of specialization other than economics in the future and we can 
regard that most of the students do not have any special knowledge of economics 
or any considerable concern related to economics. The 3rd June class lasted 90 
minutes: an 80-minute lecture followed by a 10-minute questionnaire. 
 
It is pointed out that those who have studied economics tend to be selfish 
(Marwell and Ames 1981, Frank, Gilovich and Regan 1993, 1996). In the class, 
the author briefly explained that mainstream economics supposes selfish and 
unboundedly rational economic agents using simple examples. Before starting the 
experiment, the author clearly stated that subjects (students) can select whether 
or not they suppose selfish economic agents when they answer the questions. By 
doing so, it could be expected that some subjects reply based on rational 
economic decision making and others reply based on some other decision-making 
process. Because of the students‘ status (less economic knowledge) and the brief 
explanation, it is expected that the subjects are not heavily biased toward ‗selfish‘. 
 
The questionnaire used in the experiment is presented in Table 1 (one of four 
types of questionnaire). As is stated there, in the experiment, the following 
situation was described. There is a small beautiful lake where water fowl and fish 
abound. Subjects were supposed to be farmers who used 10 tons of lake water 
per year and in the process, earned ten million yen (or nearly a hundred thousand 
dollars). If subjects increase the amount of water intake, their annual revenues 
will increase. However, as the amount of water intake increases, the possibility of 
the occurrence of a regime shift will also increase. 
 
Once regime shift occurs, annual revenues will decrease to n% of the current 
annual revenues without regime shift, where n is alternatively set to 10, 20, 30 or 
40. The author randomly distributed these 4 types of questionnaires among the 
subjects. In what follows, n% questionnaires and their respondents will be 
referred to as the n% group. 
 
In the above, farmers (subjects themselves), fishermen and tourists were 
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supposed as economic agents, where it was implicitly supposed that there is only 
one farmer who uses lake water and decides the amount of water intake. Unless 
subjects maintain the current water intake (10 tons), regime shift will not occur, 
but once they increase the water intake, there is a possibility that regime shift will 
occur. A regime shift only has a negative impact on the subjects; this impact is 
regarded as an interior cost. The impacts on fishermen and tourists may or may 
not be negative; if the impact is negative, it is regarded as an external cost for the 
subject. 
 
There are 4 questions in the questionnaire. Q1 asked the amount of water intake 
when only the subject will suffer from a negative impact if a regime shift occurs 
(there is no externality). Q2 asked the amount of water intake when both the 
subject and tourists will suffer from a negative impact if a regime shift occurs 
(there is an externality in consumption). Q3 asked the amount of water intake 
when both the subject and fishermen will suffer from a negative impact if a regime 
shift occurs (there is an externality in production). Q4 asked the subjects the 
reasons for their answers to Q1–Q3. 
 
There are two cases where the answers are the same for Q1–Q3: some 
respondents reply economically rationally, resulting in the same answers for 
Q1–Q3, while other respondents gave the same answers based on other reasons. 
Under the assumption of homo economicus, because negative impacts for tourists 
and fishermen are external costs for the subject, the decision making of the 
subject has not been influenced by the existence of these negative impacts and, 
as a result, answers to Q1–Q3 coincide. 
 
As mentioned above, 10 minutes were provided for answering the questionnaire, 
which is relatively short given the contents of the questionnaire. It is expected 
that if more answering time is provided, some subjects will calculate the optimum 
amount of water intake and answer accordingly (in fact, a few students did 
correctly arrived at the optimum solutions.) However, it is expected that many 
students do not know how to calculate the optimum solutions and those who do, 
might make calculation mistakes. A rather unfortunate occurrence would have 
been that the subjects‘ attention would be on calculation and they would answer 
without distinguishing among questions Q1, Q2 and Q3. To prevent these 
mistakes and/or undesirable concentration, the answering time was limited. 
 6 
Further, it was clearly stated that accurate answers were not required and 
subjects could answer based on their intuition. Under the above setting, it is 
expected that the average amount of water intake can be different for both the 
three questions and the four groups. 
 
To ensure that subjects are familiar with the situation presented in the experiment, 
the author provided an explanation of regime shift and introduced Aral Sea as a 
real example in the lecture. The shrinking of the Aral Sea is caused by intensive 
irrigation for agriculture in the watershed countries. The example of the Aral Sea 
is larger in scale than our experiment, but the situation is somewhat similar. The 
author presented pictures, maps and statistical data related to the shrinking of 
the Aral Sea. It may seem that further explanation may be required in the 
questionnaire (Table 1); this, however, was not provided because it was included 
in the lecture. 
 
 
3. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Current annual water intake is set at 10 tons; the maximum intake is 30 tons per 
year. The probabilities of the occurrence of a regime shift and the revenues are 
provided for every 2-ton increment from 12–30 tons. The subjects will select one 
among the 11 choices for Q1–Q3. Once the level of annual water intake is 
increased, expected annual revenue increases, reaches a maximum and then 
starts to decrease. Optimum solution refers to the average level of annual water 
intake (average intake level) wherein the expected revenue reaches a maximum. 
Critical solution refers to the highest possible average intake level wherein the 
annual revenue is higher than when the annual intake is 10 tons. The optimum 
solutions and critical solutions are 16 tons (10%), 18 tons (20%), 20 tons (30%) 
and 22 tons (40%) and 22 tons (10%), 24 tons (20%), 28 tons (30%) and 32 tons 
(40%), respectively (see Fig. 1). In our setting, because the upper limit of water 
intake is set at 30 tons, the critical solution for the 40% group (32 tons) will not 
attained. In what follows, we will use ‗risk averse‘ to refer to subjects whose 
solutions are less than the optimum solution and ‗risk loving‘ to refer to those 
whose solutions more than the optimum solution. 
 
3.1 Differences in the responses among groups 
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Fig. 1 depicts the average intake level of the subjects, optimum solutions and 
critical solutions for the 4 groups. First, let us compare the optimum solutions and 
average intake level of subjects. Average intake levels for Q1 are 18.26 tons 
(10%), 18.81 tons (20%), 19.67 tons (30%) and 23.89 tons (40%). The 
differences between the optimum solutions and average intake levels are –2.26 
tons (10%), –0.81 ton (20%), 0.33 ton (30%) and –1.89 tons (40%), which are 
quite small. We applied the two independent samples t-test for the difference 
between the optimum solutions and average intake levels1)1. For all groups, the 
null hypothesis that there are no differences between the two samples was not 
rejected at 10% (two-tail test). Therefore, the differences between the optimum 
solutions and average intake levels are not statistically significant for all groups. 
 
The values of the optimum solutions increase as the reduction rate of the annual 
revenue decreases (that is, as n increases from 10–40). Average intake levels for 
Q1 also seem to exhibit this trend. We confirm this finding statistically. First, we 
used the Bartlett test to test the homogeneity of variance. The null hypothesis is 
that the variances in the water intake values of every group are the same. The 
test statistic was 18.29 and the null hypothesis was rejected at 1%. Therefore we 
used the Kruskal-Wallis test, which is a non-parametric test, and test the null 
hypothesis that there are no differences in the average water intake values of the 
4 groups. The test statistic was 15.52 and the null hypothesis was rejected at 1%. 
Therefore, it is statistically shown that at least the average value of one group is 
different from those of the others. In our case, as is easily seen from the values 
(and Fig. 1), average intake levels increase with n. 
 
Next, we proceed to Q2 (Fig. 2). The average intake levels for Q2 are 13.32 tons 
(10%), 12.11 tons (20%), 12.72 tons (30%) and 14.27 tons (40%). The 
differences between the optimum solutions and average intake levels are 2.68 
tons (10%), 5.89 tons (20%), 7.28 tons (30%) and 7.73 tons (40%). Finally, we 
proceed to Q3. The average intake levels for Q3 are 13.26 tons (10%), 12.22 tons 
(20%), 13.67 tons (30%) and 13.78 tons (40%). The differences between the 
optimum solutions and average intake levels are 2.74 tons (10%), 5.78 tons 
                                                   
1 We used SPSS 17.0 for the following tests: two independent samples t-test, 
Kruskal-Wallis test, Friedman test, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. In all other 
instances, we calculated manually. 
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(20%), 6.33 tons (30%) and 8.22 tons (40%). 
 
The values of optimum solutions increase as n increases. However, average intake 
levels for Q2 and Q3 seem not to exhibit this trend. We confirm this statistically as 
in the case of Q1. The test statistics of the Bartlett test were 46.13 and 9.92 for Q2 
and Q3, respectively; the null hypotheses were rejected at 1% and 5% for Q2 and 
Q3, respectively. Therefore, we used the Kruskal-Wallis test. The test statistics 
were 2.64 and 2.55 for Q2 and Q3, respectively; the null hypotheses were not 
rejected at 10%. Therefore, the differences among the average values of the 4 
groups are not statistically significant. 
 
Because the average intake levels for all groups for Q2 and Q3 are similar (as is 
suggested above), we use the Friedman test, which is a non-parametric test, and 
test the null hypothesis that there are no differences among the 8 average water 
intake values. The test statistics was 5.4 and the null hypothesis was not rejected 
at 10%. This result implies that (1) the subjects do not distinguish between the 
externalities in production and consumption and that (2) when externality occurs, 
the differences among the 4 groups do not influence the average intake levels. 
 
3.2 Differences in the standard variations of the responses among the 
groups 
Standard variations are 7.37 (10%), 6.39 (20%), 7.24 (30%) and 5.44 (40%) for 
Q1; 5.01 (10%), 4.03 (20%), 3.58 (30%) and 5.85 (40%) for Q2; and 5.19 
(10%), 4.49 (20%), 4.79 (30%) and 5.67 (40%) for Q3. This suggests that the 
standard variations for Q1 are substantially larger than those for Q2 and Q3 for all 
groups except for the 40% group. 
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was applied to these 12 cases to test the null 
hypothesis that the variable follows a normal distribution. The null hypothesis was 
rejected at 5% for all cases. Therefore, we cannot apply normal distribution using 
the average values and the standard variations of each case to calculate the 
percentage of subjects whose water intake is within a certain level. However, 
because the average intake levels for Q1 are close to the optimum values and 
standard variations are generally larger, there is a high possibility that many 
subjects select water intake levels which are higher than the critical solutions. On 
the other hand, because average intake levels for Q2 and Q3 are fairly less than 
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the optimum values and standard variations are generally smaller, there is a low 
possibility of the above occurring. 
 
3.3 Response patterns for Q1–Q3 and the answers to Q4 
In the questionnaire, the subjects were asked to provide the reasons for their 
answers. The responses are classified and summarized in Table 3. 
 
Q1 = Q2 = Q3 type: such responses account for 20.3% of the responses. From 
Q4, we get that only 6% (30% of this type) of respondents responded based on 
economically rational decision making. The rest 14% (70% of this type) 
responded due to different reasons. One of the reasons is that the subjects 
wanted to avoid the risk of a regime shift. Table 4 shows the number of 
respondents who selected 10 tons for Q1–Q3. In the 10%–30% groups, almost 
half of the respondents selected 10 tons. From the responses to Q4, we get that 
the reason for selecting 10 tons is to avoid the risk of a regime shift. On the other 
hand, in the 40% group, no respondent selected 10 tons. 
 
Table 4 shows the average intake levels for those whose three responses were 
equal (Q1 = Q2 = Q3). Average intake levels are 12.5–13.78 tons in 10%–30% 
groups; the corresponding figure for the 40% group is 18.8 tons. Thus, at least for 
such respondents, there is a tendency to lower the average intake level when the 
impact of a regime shift on them is high (10%–30% groups) and to increase the 
average intake level when the impact of a regime shift on them is less (40% 
group). Because our sample size is small, we applied the Kruskal-Wallis test to 
test the null hypothesis that there are no differences among the 4 average intake 
levels. The test statistic was 5.9 and the null hypothesis was not rejected at 10%. 
We do not have a statistically significant result but once enough data is 
accumulated, the result may change. 
 
Q1 > Q2 = Q3 type: such responses account for 59.5% of the responses. From 
Q4, we get that most of the respondents state that they increase their level of 
water intake even if the risk of a regime shift rises as long as there is no 
externality, but avoid increasing their level of water intake if externalities exist. As 
a result, average intake level in Q1 is 22.2 tons, which is close to the average 
optimum value of 19.0 tons, the average of the optimum solutions for the 4 
groups. However, the average level of water intake in Q2 and Q3 is 11.6 tons, 
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which is substantially lower than the average optimum value. 
 
Q1 > Q2 > Q3 and Q1 > Q3 > Q2 type: such responses account for 8.1% 
(5.4% + 2.7%) of the responses. While the responses of the Q1 > Q2 = Q3 type 
do not distinguish between the externalities in production and in consumption, 
such responses do. Respondents whose responses were of the Q1 > Q2 > Q3 type 
find the influence of the externality in production to be stronger than that of the 
externality in consumption; for the respondents whose responses were of the Q1 
> Q3 > Q2 type, the inverse holds true. 
 
Others: such responses account for 12.2% of the responses. Most of the 
respondents provide inconsequential explanation, (not) focusing on specific 
impact(s) (e.g., ignoring the impact on fishery) or creating specific situations (e.g., 
making new assumptions for the relationship between fish, water fowls and water 
quality and accordingly answering). Because such responses vary considerably 
and are essentially non-consequential, we omit the details for such responses. 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
Based on traditional mainstream economics and environmental economics, 
subjects will select an economically rational level of water intake under the 
assumption of homo economicus without taking account of external benefits or 
external costs. However, the results of the experiments suggest that if there is a 
possibility that subjects‘ actions will cause substantial environmental problems in 
the form of a regime shift and result in serious damage to other economic agents 
in the form of externalities, the subjects will not behave economically rational and 
will not ignore external costs. 
 
If subjects behave economically rationally, the average intake level for Q1–Q3 will 
coincide. Only 6% of our responses that had the same water intake level for the 
three questions were based on economically rational decision making while 14% 
of our responses that had the same water intake level for the three questions were 
based on different reasons. Based on these results, we can say that when subjects 
have little knowledge of economics, most will select the level of water intake using 
a decision-making process other than that of economic, even if an explanation is 
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provided for the assumption of homo economicus. 
 
In what follows, we will examine the results in greater detail. First, let us consider 
the average values of the responses. If only the subjects will be negatively 
impacted, they may exhibit risk loving behaviour but if other economic agents will 
also be negatively impacted, the subjects are averse to risk. When there is no 
externality, the selection of the level of water intake is consistent with the 
economically rational optimum solutions predicted by traditional theory. Further, 
subjects seem to reply correctly based on their intuition because here the 
answering time was limited to 10 minutes. 
 
When externalities exist, subjects take external costs into account and lower the 
level of water intake. There are at least two reasons as to why we obtained such 
results. First, it might be because, in our experiences, there is no real money 
transfer and the subjects therefore behave nicely. 
 
Second, there may be an incentive which is similar to the warm glow effect. This 
incentive resulted in subjects exhibiting risk avoidance behaviour when 
externalities exist. The warm glow effect implies that the subjects feel good that 
their behaviour will have positive consequences for others. In our case, subjects 
seek to reduce their guilt because their behaviour will have negative 
consequences for others. This can be referred to as the guilt-alleviation effect. In 
our experience, because only one subject will have a substantial negative effect 
on the environment, the guilt-alleviation effect is stronger than in the case where 
there are at least two subjects who have a negative effect on the environment. 
 
The most common response was Q1 > Q2 = Q3. Q2 is the case where externality 
in consumption occurs and Q3 is the case where externality in production occurs. 
Because externalities in consumption and production affect the utility function of 
the households and the production function of the producers, respectively, it is 
expected that the latter externality is easier to recognize for the subjects as a 
monetarily negative impact. However, the difference between the average intake 
levels for Q2 and Q3 is not statistically significant. This implies that subjects 
exhibited similar risk avoidance behaviour regardless of the type of externality. 
One of the reasons may be that the situation in this experiment is considerably 
simple and the total biomass of water fowls and fishes has not been described in 
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detail. Further, a detailed description of a regime shift was not provided. 
Nevertheless, there are no statistically significant differences among the 8 
average water intake levels (for 10–40% groups for Q2 and Q3). However, it can 
be inferred that the same risk avoidance behaviour was exhibited for the different 
types of influences. 
 
Next, let us consider the variance of the responses. If there is no externality (Q1), 
it is easier for the subjects to express their primary preference for risk. Subjects 
need not consider externalities; they exhibit risk-loving behaviour, and as such, 
standard variance takes larger values. In fact, the standard variance for Q1 is 
larger than those for Q2 and Q3. This fact supports that in Q1, the subjects both 
risk avoidance and risk-loving behaviour, and that in Q2 and Q3, the subjects tend 
to avoid risk and reduce water intake. 
 
Finally, let us consider the cases where the average values for Q1–Q3 are the 
same. As illustrated in Table 4, if the damages are expected to be large 
(10%–30%), subjects tend to exhibit altruistic behaviour whereas if the damage 
is less serious (40%) subjects tend to exhibit selfish or economically rational 
behaviour. Further, the lack of significance may be due to the small group sizes 
and the small sample size. Statistically significant results may be obtained from 
larger samples and larger sample sizes. In this paper, because we used university 
freshmen as subjects, the results may change if we apply the same experiment to 
different groups. Further, because the subjects are not faced with real money 
transfer and they also have little experience of real farm management, their 
answers for Q2 and Q3 might be too low. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Thus far, environmental issues have been treated as externalities in mainstream 
and environmental economics, and homo economicus has been assumed. This 
paper examined whether externality occurs because of the subjects‘ economically 
rational behaviour using experimental economic approach in the framework of 
regime shift. 
 
Our results suggest that when there is no externality, subjects act economically 
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rationally but when there is an externality, subjects exhibit risk avoidance 
behaviour. We proposed that guilt-alleviation effect will exist and subjects will 
exhibit risk avoidance behaviour when externalities can happen. We also obtained 
the results that risk avoidance behaviour is independent of the impact of the 
externality. These results have serious implications for current economics that 
considers environmental issues to be externalities right from the start. As such, it 
may be conducive to reconsider a new image of an economic agent. 
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Table 1 Questionnaire (for the 10% group) 
 
Suppose that there is a small scenic lake. In this small lake, water fowls and 
fish abound. Suppose that you are a farmer and use lake water for 
agriculture. There are fishermen who fish in the lake for a living. Moreover, 
tens of thousands of tourists visit this lake to watch water fowls and the 
beautiful scenery. You have managed your agricultural drainage properly and 
the drainage has no impact on the water fowls, fish and the beautiful scenery 
of the lake. 
Suppose that you are now thinking of increasing the level of water intake. 
Suppose that you are now taking 10 tons of lake water annually and 
earn ten million yen from agriculture annually. If a regime shift does 
not happen, your revenue will increase. However, once a regime shift 
happens, water quality decreases and your revenue will be 10% of your 
current revenue. The details are tabulated as follows. 
 
(Unit: million yen) 
Water intake 10t 12t 14t 16t 18t 20t 22t 24t 26t 28t 30t 
Without 
regime shift 
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 
With regime 
shift 
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 
Probability 
of regime 
shift 
0% 
10
% 
20
% 
30
% 
40
% 
50
% 
60
% 
70
% 
80
% 
90
% 
100
% 
For example, suppose that you select 12 tons. Your annual revenue will be 
12 million yen if a regime shift does not occur but it will be 1.2 million yen 
if a regime shift occurs. The possibility of the latter (1.2 million) is 10% 
whereas that of the former (12 million) is 100 – 10% = 90%. 
 
Q1 Scientists predict that the beautiful scenery of the lake and the 
number of water fowls and fishes will be maintained if a regime 
shift happens. Then, what is your choice for the level of water intake. 
Select one option from the above table. 
________ tons 
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Q2 Scientists predict that the beautiful scenery of the lake will be 
degraded and the number of water fowls will decrease but the 
number of fish will be maintained if a regime shift happens. Then, 
what is your choice for the level of water intake. Select one option from 
the above table. 
________ tons 
 
Q3 Scientists predict that the beautiful scenery of the lake and the 
number of water fowls will be maintained but the number of fish 
will be decreased by half if a regime shift happens. Then, what is your 
choice for the level of water intake. Select one option from the above 
table. 
________ tons 
 
Q4 Provide a brief explanation for your answers to the above three 
questions. The contents of the lecture need not be taken into account 
here. 
＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
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Table 2 Differences in standard variations of the responses among groups 
 
 10% 20% 30% 40% 
Q1 7.37 6.39 7.24 5.44 
Q2 5.01 4.03 3.58 5.85 
Q3 5.19 4.49 4.79 5.67 
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Table 3 Response rates for the different response types 
 
 10% 20% 30% 40% Total 
 38 37 36 37 148 
Q1 = Q2 = Q3      
Economic 3 (7.9%) 1 (2.7%) 2 (5.6%) 3 (8.1%) 9 (6.1%) 
Non-economic 6 (15.8%) 7 (18.9%) 6 (16.7%) 2 (5.4%) 21 (14.2%) 
Q1 > Q2 = Q3 21 (55.3%) 24 (64.9%) 20 (55.6%) 23 (62.2%) 88 (59.5%) 
Q1 > Q2 > Q3 2 (5.3%) 1 (2.7%) 2 (5.6%) 3 (8.1%) 8 (5.4%) 
Q1 = Q2 > Q3 1 (2.6%) 2 (5.4%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (5.4%) 5 (3.4%) 
Q1 > Q3 > Q2 0 (0.0%) 1 (2.7%) 2 (5.6%) 1 (2.7%) 4 (2.7%) 
Q1 = Q3 > Q2 1 (2.6%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (5.4%) 3 (2.0%) 
Q1 < Q2 = Q3 2 (5.3%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (2.7%) 3 (2.0%) 
Q1 < Q3 < Q2 1 (2.6%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (2.8%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (1.4%) 
Q2 < Q1 < Q3 0 (0.0%) 1 (2.7%) 1 (2.8%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (1.4%) 
Q1 = Q3 < Q2 1 (2.6%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.7%) 
Q1 < Q2 < Q3 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (2.8%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.7%) 
Q1 = Q2 < Q3 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (2.8%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.7%) 
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Table 4 Response rates for Q1 = Q2 = Q3 
 
  10% 20% 30% 40% 
Q1 = Q2 = Q3 9  8 8 5 
10 tons throughout 4 5 4 0 
 (44.4%) (62.5%) (50.0%) (0%) 
Average intake 13.78  13.25  12.50  18.80  
Optimum solution 16 18 20 22 
 20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Average water intake levels with and without externalities (Q1) 
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Fig. 2 Average water intake levels with and without externalities (Q2, Q3) 
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